

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1
TOP SECRET

11 May 1966

25X1



25X1



Copy No. C160




CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed. On file USAID release instructions apply.

25X1



GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

11 May 1966


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. Communist China: Mao Tse-tung's reappearance does not dispell all questions raised by his long absence. (Page 4)



25X1

4. Pakistan: Ayub determined to match Indian arms buildup. (Page 6)
5. Congo (Leopoldville) - Belgium: Congolese delegation in Brussels to discuss financial issues. (Page 7)
6. Iraq: Tentative moves being taken to settle Kurdish rebellion. (Page 8)
7. Rumania-USSR: Brezhnev's Bucharest visit may be to remind Rumanians of their limited maneuverability between Moscow and Peking. (Page 9)
8. Notes:  Chile; Guatemala. (Page 10)

25X1

AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES POSSIBLY INTRODUCED INTO AIR WAR OVER NORTH VIETNAM

AA-2 Atoll



GUIDANCE: INFRARED HOMING

RANGE: 5-6 NAUTICAL MILES

LENGTH: 9.3 FEET

WARHEAD: HIGH-EXPLOSIVE, BLAST FRAGMENTATION

REMARKS: The ATOLL appears to be an exact replica of the US Sidewinder Missile. It first became operational in 1959. The interceptor must approach its target from the rear on a pursuit course and have the missile pointed directly at the target at launch.



62200

25X1

25X1


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 May 1966

*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in North Vietnam: DRV aircraft attacked US planes with air-to-air missiles for the first time on 10 May. According to an initial debriefing of US pilots, three MIG-17s attacked two US A1E Skyraiders and two helicopters which had just retrieved a downed pilot in the vicinity of Yen Bai in the northwestern DRV. US pilots reported that two missiles, which appeared similar to the US Sidewinder missile, were fired by the MIGs. No further details of the encounter are presently available. There was no reported damage to the US aircraft.

It appears from the pilot descriptions that the North Vietnamese MIGs were equipped with the AA-2 Atoll, an infrared, heat-seeking missile believed to be a duplicate of the US Sidewinder heat-seeking missile.



25X1

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No significant military engagements have been reported during the past 24 hours.

Interrogation of a North Vietnamese soldier

[redacted] indicates that the North Vietnamese 304th Division may be in the Laos-Cambodia-South Vietnamese border area [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the entire division was infiltrated into the highlands. Information from a notebook taken from a dead Communist soldier lends credence to the captive's statements. Confirmation of this information would place two North Vietnamese divisions--the 325th and the 304th--in the highlands area.

(continued)

25X1

Political Developments in South Vietnam: Buddhist leaders, although exercising a restraining influence with regard to potentially violent issues, are engaging in widespread political maneuverings.

[Buddhist monks recently approached Premier Ky with suggestions that he either assume "one-man rule" to prevent disruptive forces from interfering with plans for constitutional assembly elections, or purge controversial members from the ruling Directorate and the cabinet, [REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

In I Corps, Buddhist struggle leaders have been pressuring local authorities to remove a district chief in the Hue area who has refused to support their movement. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] Premier Ky has decided to postpone the holding of local elections, scheduled late this month, to replace one-third of the provincial and municipal council members elected in May 1965. Although most of

11 May 66

25X1

the incumbent councilors had favored such a postponement, the government's action may be seized upon by its critics as a further indication that it is uninterested in this summer's constitutional assembly elections.

[The government commissioner for montagnard affairs, Paul Nur, has informed a US AID officer that preliminary agreement was reached in negotiations this week with representatives of the dissident tribal movement FULRO. Although still awaiting approval from government and FULRO leaders, the agreement would provide the phased return of FULRO troops and supporters to government control in return for firm government concessions on certain tribal demands.]

25X1

11 May 66

3



Photo, released by NCNA of Mao's first appearance in six months. 62202

Communist China: Mao Tse-tung's reappearance coincides with signs that a serious intraparty struggle may be developing.

The Chinese clearly felt constrained to display Mao for their Albanian ideological allies. Failure to do so would have come close to admitting the worst of foreign rumors--that Mao was no longer a significant factor in internal Chinese developments. The circumstances around his return do not dispel the questions concerning his health and the extent to which he has been exercising leadership during the six months that he was completely out of sight.

Mao's re-emergence comes at a time when Peking has just asserted that it is engaged in a "life and death struggle" with antiparty elements. This assertion was immediately followed by a highly unusual attack by one party newspaper against another. The Liberation Army Daily, which recently has spearheaded the war on intellectuals, charged on 8 May that Peking Daily was trying to cover up for the guilty elements by pulling its punches in a "sham criticism" of them. Peking Daily, which is the organ of the city's party committee, published an abject confession of its error the next day.

This exchange may be the surface manifestation of deeper problems. Serious charges of antiparty activities have been raised against a group of lesser officials of the Peking municipal party committee, and higher officials may ultimately be implicated.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

Pakistan: President Ayub has reiterated his determination to expand Pakistani military strength in the face of a continuing Indian arms buildup.

In recent conversation with Ambassador McConaughy, Ayub alleged that India is widening the margin between the military strength of the two countries by acquiring combat military equipment from the USSR, Britain, and other sources. Asserting that Pakistan must maintain a deterrent military posture vis-a-vis India, Ayub warned McConaughy that if Pakistan were blocked from US sources for procurement of lethal weapons, it would be necessary to turn elsewhere, "even to the devil himself"--presumably meaning Communist China.

The Pakistanis think that the US decision in February to resume shipments only of nonlethal military equipment does not satisfy their needs. They note that since the US aid cutoff last September they have been largely confined to such limited supplies as could be obtained from Turkey and Iran or from international arms dealers at "black market prices." They point to a need to replace combat losses in armor and aircraft and to obtain spare parts for other lethal items.

Peking has already provided some military assistance, including small arms, artillery, tanks, and a ^{possible} number of MIG-19s.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Pakistan's minister of commerce who is now touring Western Europe has contracted with France for three submarines to be delivered in two years.

It is not clear whether Pakistan will cut back on its economic development program in order to finance procurement of arms. In recent weeks Finance Minister Shoaib has made conflicting statements to McConaughy on the question of financing.

25X1

Congo (Leopoldville) - Belgium: A delegation headed by Premier Mulamba is scheduled to arrive in Brussels tomorrow to discuss outstanding financial issues.

Behind the issues themselves, which relate to the old debts of the Congo when it was under Belgian rule, is President Mobutu's concern over the continued pre-eminence of Belgian interests in the Congolese economy. In the past few weeks he has become hypersensitive to reminders of the Belgian presence.

[Mobutu's attitude stems partly from rumors that Belgian financial and business interests are supporting an attempt by former Premier Tshombé to return to the Congo.]

Mobutu is also eager to prove that he is a true African nationalist and not a Belgian lackey. The recent announcement of a rise in copper prices by Brussels-based Union Minière without prior consultation prompted Mobutu to demand that all Congolese enterprises locate their main offices in the Congo. He also raised copper export duties to drain off some of the profits earned by foreign business.

Mobutu seems intent upon finding some new means to demonstrate his control of the Congo. [There has been talk that he might nationalize foreign enterprises,] but both Mulamba and Foreign Minister Bomboko, who is accompanying the premier to Brussels, are less volatile than Mobutu and are likely to settle for moderate concessions.

The Belgians are not ready to renegotiate the major economic agreements but might make gestures to appease Mobutu.

25X1

Iraq: [The Baghdad regime is making tentative moves toward a settlement of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq, but prospects are far from bright]



25X1

[Although the regime probably is willing to concede some nominal form of autonomy for the Kurdish region, major problems remain to be solved. The question of disbanding the Kurdish guerrilla forces, for example, has not yet been discussed. A recent upsurge of fighting in the north may also discourage further moves toward a settlement.]

[The Iranians, who have provided major assistance to the rebel movement, would prefer to see the war continue in order to keep the Iraqi regime off balance and to maintain their own leverage on Baghdad.]

25X1

25X1

Rumania-USSR: Party General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Bucharest suggests, in part, a Soviet effort to remind the Rumanians of their narrowing room for maneuver between Moscow and Peking.

According to press reports, Konstantin Rusakov, a Soviet specialist in relations with ruling Asian Communist parties, is accompanying Brezhnev. The Russians will undoubtedly go over international Communist problems with the Rumanians with a particular eye to Chou En-lai's trip to Rumania later this month.

During his three-day visit, Brezhnev probably intends also to review with Rumanian leaders plans for a high-level meeting of Warsaw Pact members reportedly to be held in Bucharest in mid-July. Earlier, Rumanian leaders were said to have been reluctant to attend a Warsaw Pact meeting.

In a highly nationalistic speech on 7 May opening the Rumanian party's 45th anniversary celebrations, party chief Ceausescu criticized Soviet party interference in Rumanian affairs through such organizations as the Comintern and the Cominform. He also reiterated the Rumanian view that the existence of military blocs is an anachronism and that they must cease.

25X1

25X1

Chile: Chilean opinion is becoming increasingly vocal and indignant against scheduled French nuclear tests in the Pacific. Protests in information media and by all political parties--especially the opposition Communist-Socialist Popular Action Front--are forcing the government to consider more drastic action than the two recent representations it has made to the French ambassador. The government is seeking a meeting of west coast foreign ministers and hopes to obtain a UN investigation of the risk of radiation damage to Latin America.

25X1

*Guatemala: Provisional President Peralta declared a 30-day state of seige last night because of increased terrorism and kidnaping of key officials in the capital. [The decree will reportedly have the support and approval of the new congress which was installed on 5 May.] A curfew may be imposed, constitutional guarantees have been suspended, and the military have taken on certain police functions.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistants to the President

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008900390001-1

~~TOP SECRET~~